



# Nigeria: Anambra

## TEACHERS

SABER Country Report

2012

### Policy Goals

### Status

#### 1. Setting Clear Expectations for Teachers

While clear expectations exist, teachers may lack the time outside of class time to prepare meaningful activities and complete other tasks.



#### 2. Attracting the Best into Teaching

While evidence suggests the teaching profession is valued, high student-teacher ratios and poor school infrastructure may make teacher work environments unappealing.



#### 3. Preparing Teachers with Useful Training and Experience

All new teachers must at a minimum complete a postsecondary program that includes mentoring programs.



#### 4. Matching Teachers' Skills with Students' Needs

There are no incentives for teaching in hard-to-staff schools, and experienced teachers may transfer out of those areas first. While there are identified critical shortage subjects, there are no incentives to attract qualified teachers to them.



#### 5. Leading Teachers with Strong Principals

Principals have substantial academic and practical requirements. Induction programs and internships help prepare them, but they may lack authority.



#### 6. Monitoring Teaching and Learning

While there is a system of teacher evaluations to guide improvement, there are no student evaluations to help inform teachers in the classroom or systemwide.



#### 7. Supporting Teachers to Improve Instruction

While teachers can receive professional development based on evaluations, professional development is not an integrated requirement to help all teachers improve.



#### 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform

There are no requirements to remain in the profession, and while evaluations affect pay, they affect less than one percent of compensation.



## The Importance of Teacher Policies<sup>1</sup>

Research suggests that teacher quality is the main school-based predictor of student achievement and that several consecutive years of outstanding teaching can offset the learning deficits of disadvantaged students (Hanushek and Rivkin, 2006; Nye et al, 2004; Park and Hannum, 2001; Rivkin et al, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Sanders, 1998; Sanders and Rivers 1996; and Vignoles et al, 2000). However, it is not yet clear exactly which teacher policies can raise teacher effectiveness (Goldhaber, 2002 and Rivkin et al, 2005). Thus, devising effective policies to improve teaching quality remains a challenge.

There is increasing interest across the globe to attract, retain, develop and motivate great teachers. While the World Bank has ample experience in supporting teacher policy reforms in developing countries, until recently there was no systematic effort to offer data and analysis that can provide policy guidance on teacher policies.

A new tool, **Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER)-Teachers**, fills this gap by collecting, analyzing, synthesizing, and disseminating comprehensive information on teacher policies in primary and secondary education across a range of different education systems. In this report, we discuss how SABER-Teachers has been applied in Anambra, Nigeria. Our goal is to enable policymakers to learn about how other countries address the same policy challenges related to teacher management and thus how to make well-informed policy choices that will lead to improved learning outcomes.<sup>2</sup>

## Overview of SABER-Teachers

**SABER-Teachers collects data on 10 core teacher policy areas in order to offer a comprehensive overview of teacher policies in each education system.** These policy areas are listed in Box 1. It is important to highlight that SABER-Teachers’ main focus is on the policies formally adopted by education systems. While in some cases the data collected also address how the teacher policy goals are achieved in practice, the nature of our data

<sup>1</sup> In order to offer guidance to policy makers in client countries on how to raise education quality, the Education Unit at the World Bank’s Human Development Department has launched Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER), an initiative that seeks to collect information about different education systems’ policy domains, analyze it to identify common challenges and promising solutions.

<sup>2</sup> The focus of the initiative is the design of teacher policies as opposed to their implementation.


collection approach (based on interviews with key informants and official document review) do not allow for a thorough assessment of policy implementation. Therefore, complementary research will be useful in most settings.

### Box 1: Key Teacher Policy Areas

Teacher Policy Dimensions
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Requirements to enter and remain in teaching</li> <li>• Initial teacher preparation</li> <li>• Recruitment and employment</li> <li>• Teachers’ workload and autonomy</li> <li>• Professional development</li> <li>• Compensation (salary and non-salary benefits)</li> <li>• Retirement rules and benefits</li> <li>• Monitoring and evaluation of teacher quality</li> <li>• Teacher representation and voice</li> <li>• School leadership</li> </ul>

To analyze these data and offer informed policy guidance, SABER-Teachers analyzes progress on eight teacher policy goals. SABER-Teachers used three criteria to select these teacher policy goals. They are: (i) linked to performance through evidence provided by research and studies; (ii) a high priority for resource allocation; and (iii) actionable. The 8 teacher policy goals are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Teacher Policy Goals



The eight teacher policy goals exclude other objectives that countries might want to pursue to increase the effectiveness of teachers. These were excluded because there is to date insufficient empirical basis on which to make specific policy recommendations, either because

evidence on policy interventions in that area remains unclear or because the top-performing education systems take very different approaches to reach these objectives.<sup>3</sup> For a more detailed report on the eight teacher policy goals and the evidence supporting this selection, please see Vegas et al (2010).

### Findings in Nigeria

SABER-Teachers collected policy data for Nigeria’s Anambra, Bauchi, and Ekiti states. Table 1 presents the extent to which each education system has progressed in the eight SABER-Teachers policy goals. Our analysis indicates that each teacher policy system has relative strengths and weaknesses. However, across the three systems, we observed some general patterns, which are the focus of this report.

**Goal 1: Setting clear expectations for teachers:** All education systems in these states are Established in this policy goal, which means they have developed: (i) explicitly defined standards for what students should know and be able to do, as well as curricula to guide teaching and learning; (ii) officially stipulated tasks for teachers; and (iii) delineated official time allocations that enable teachers to fulfill their duties.

**Goal 2: Attracting the best into teaching:** With the exception of Bauchi, the other states are Established in this policy goal, which means they have: (i) entry requirements that allow screening of talented individuals; (ii) attractive pay and benefits; (iii) appealing working conditions; and (iv) attractive career opportunities within the teaching profession. In Bauchi,

<sup>3</sup> For example, SABER-Teachers collects information on teacher organizations (as part of the policy area of “teacher representation and voice”) and will make it publicly available. Yet no clear trend has emerged regarding whether (and if so, how) governments should engage with these organizations in policy formulation or consultation. To be sure, many studies have looked at the impact of unionization on schools’ productivity (Argys and Reese, 1995; Eberts and Stone, 1986; and Hoxby 1996), student learning (Kingdon and Teal, 2008; Kleiner and Petree, 1988; Kurth, 1987; Register and Grimes, 1991; and Steelman et al, 2000), teachers’ wages (Ballou and Podgursky, 2002; Baugh and Stone, 1982; Bee and Dolton, 1995; and Dolton and Robson, 1996), working conditions (Eberts, 1984; Murillo et al, 2002; and Zegarra and Ravina, 2003) and education policy (Goldschmidt and Stuart, 1986 and Woodbury, 1985). But even top-performing countries differ widely in how much they engage, to what extent they regulate, and how they organize teachers’ unions. Data collected by SABER-Teachers will offer guidance on how to approach these issues in the future.

there is an opportunity to strengthen its policies in this domain.

**Table 1: Levels of Development of Teacher Policies in Nigeria**

	Anambra	Bauchi	Ekiti
1. Setting clear expectations for teachers	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○
2. Attracting the best into teaching	Established ●●●○	Emerging ●●○○	Established ●●●○
3. Preparing teachers with useful training and experience	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○
4. Matching teachers' skills with students' needs	Emerging ●●○○	Latent ●○○○	Latent ●○○○
5. Leading teachers with strong principals	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○
6. Monitoring teaching and learning	Emerging ●●○○	Emerging ●●○○	Emerging ●●○○
7. Supporting teachers to improve instruction	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○	Emerging ●●○○
8. Motivating teachers to perform	Emerging ●●○○	Established ●●●○	Established ●●●○

**Goal 3: Preparing teachers with useful training and experience:** In this policy goal, all systems are Established, which means they have developed: (i) minimum standards for pre-service training programs; (ii) requirements for classroom experience for all teachers; and (iii) induction or mentoring programs to help smooth the transition from training into teaching.

**Goal 4: Matching teachers’ skills with students’ needs:** This policy goal remains a challenge in all states. Anambra is Emerging in this policy goal, while Bauchi and Ekiti are lagging behind. Top-performing education systems have established incentives to attract teachers to work in hard-to-staff schools and/or to teach certain subjects such as math and science.

**Goal 5: Leading teachers with strong principals:** All education systems in these states are Established in this policy goal, which means they have developed: (i) requirements to become a principal and attract

talented candidates; (ii) established incentives for principals to perform well; (iii) provide autonomy to principals to make decisions related to instruction or personnel management for their schools.

**Goal 6: Monitoring teaching and learning:** In this policy goal, all states are Emerging, which indicates an opportunity to strengthen its policies in this domain. High-performing education systems have established student learning assessment systems and teacher performance appraisal mechanisms—factors that have been shown to enhance student learning outcomes.

**Goal 7: Supporting teachers to improve instruction:** With the exception of Ekiti, the other states are Established in this policy goal, which means teachers are provided with performance data to help them improve teaching practices, and these data are also used by principals to develop professional development plans for teachers. In Ekiti, there is an opportunity to strengthen its policies in this domain.

**Goal 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform:** With the exception of Anambra, the other states are Established in this policy goal, which means there are minimum mechanisms to hold teachers accountable as well as rewards and sanctions for high- and low-performing teachers, respectively. In Anambra, there is an opportunity to strengthen its policies in this domain.

## Findings in Anambra, Nigeria

### Goal 1: Setting clear expectations for teachers:

Established



Setting clear expectations for teachers is important for several reasons. First, expectations for student and teacher performance influence how potential entrants perceive the profession. The clearer these expectations, the more likely an education system is to get the type of teacher it seeks. Second, expectations guide teachers' work. The more specific they are, the better teachers can organize their time and resources to meet them. Finally, expectations can help align the goals of different key aspects of the profession (e.g., pre-service training, professional development and teacher appraisals). The more institutionalized these expectations are, the more

likely all of these aspects will be working towards a common purpose and thus the more likely it will be achieved. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:

- Are there clear expectations for what students should know and be able to do?
- Are there clear expectations for what teachers are supposed to do?
- Do teachers have enough time to fulfill their duties?

In Anambra, there are clear expectations for what teachers and students are supposed to do, but teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their duties. Expectations for what students should know and be able to do are clear. Nigeria has a national curriculum, which sets the contents in detail, informing teachers of required subject content that should be taught to students at different grades. In addition, expectations for what teachers are supposed to do are explicitly laid out in legal regulations and teachers are guided by performance goals. However, teachers may not have enough time to fulfill their duties. Similar to top-performing education system, the school year consists of 800 hours or more at both the primary and the secondary level. In addition, teachers' working time is defined as the overall number of working hours, which recognizes teaching, lesson planning and administrative tasks. Primary school teachers working time is between 1,000 to 1,520 hours per year, and secondary school teachers work more than 1,530 hours per year. In Anambra, the number of hours that teachers are expected to devote to teaching is 80 percent to 100 percent of their working time. In comparison successful education systems with data make teaching hours 30 to 50 percent (primary) of working hours, suggesting that they build in time for other tasks that teachers need to carry out, such as administrative duties and grading assignments, among others.

### Goal 2: Attracting the Best into teaching:

Established



Getting talented people to go into teaching is essential for several reasons (Guarino, Santibáñez & Daley 2006). First, more able individuals make better teachers (Boyd, et al. 2008). The better the quality of the teaching force, the more likely an education system is to have effective teachers. Second, top candidates maximize the impact of teacher training (whether traditional or abridged). If

the quality of student teachers is too low, training is likely to focus more on making up for their deficits in knowledge and skills and less on turning them into effective teachers. Finally, luring top talent into teaching has a “multiplier” effect: if teaching attracts qualified people, competitive candidates who had not considered teaching might be drawn to it. SABER - Teachers considers four policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal.<sup>4</sup>

- Are entry requirements set up to attract talented candidates?
- Are pay and benefits appealing for talented candidates?
- Are working conditions appealing for talented candidates?
- Are there attractive career opportunities?

In Anambra, entry requirements are set up to attract talented applicants and pay and benefits are appealing. There is an established process to screen applicants to pre-service teacher training, and there are requirements to become either a primary or secondary school teacher. Further, 90 percent or more of primary school teachers meet these requirements. In Anambra, data on what models of pre-service teacher training (concurrent, consecutive, or alternative) are unavailable. Pay and benefits are appealing for talented candidates, with highly competitive starting salaries (80 percent or more of GDP per capita). Teachers in Anambra are generally paid on time, and pay changes considerably over a teacher’s career. The salary schedule is differentiated by both geographic area and student population, and teacher pay takes into account performance evaluations. In addition, teachers are entitled to both retirement and health benefits.

While there are attractive career opportunities, working conditions could be made more appealing for talented candidates. Approximately 50 percent to 69 percent of schools comply with the standards for infrastructure, hygiene, and sanitation. In addition, there are 51 or

more primary school students per teacher, and 25 to 30 secondary school students per teacher. It is worth noting that top-performing education systems usually have less than 25 students per teacher.

Attractive career opportunities exist. At the school level, upon the decision of either, principals, school owners or municipal authorities, teachers can take on leadership positions. In addition, teachers can apply for both principal posts and academic posts, such as, academic lead-teachers, master teachers and heads of departments.

### Goal 3: Preparing Teachers with Useful Training and Experience:

Established



Equipping teachers with the skills they need to succeed in a classroom is crucial. First, few (if any) individuals are born effective teachers. Teachers need subject matter knowledge, classroom management skills and lots of practice in order to be successful in a classroom. In addition, preparation puts all teachers on an equal footing, giving them a common framework to work and improve their practice. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:<sup>5</sup>

- Are there minimum standards for pre-service teaching training programs?
- Are individuals required to have classroom experience to be allowed to teach?
- Do teachers have a smooth transition from pre-service training into their first job?

In Anambra, there are minimum standards for pre-service training, individuals are required to have classroom experience, and beginning teachers are required to participate in an induction or mentoring program. There is an accreditation process for pre-service teacher training programs, and specifications on

<sup>4</sup> One issue that is not included in this list because of lack of clear guidance from available evidence on how to tackle it is that of the “flexibility” of the profession. Several studies find that some women prefer to teach because they can take leaves of absence to take care of their families without incurring wage penalties when they come back (Flyer & Rosen 1997; Stinebrickner 1999a, 1999b, 2001a, 2001b). Yet, it is unclear that education systems want to attract these candidates any more than other groups.

<sup>5</sup> One aspect not included in this framework because no data on this indicator was collected is that of teacher certification. Although the definition of teacher certification varies by country (and sometimes, within one country), studies have found that a certification status is generally associated with higher teacher effectiveness (Darling-Hammond 1999a, 1999b; Darling-Hammond, Barnett & Thorenson 2001; E. J. Fuller 1999; Goldhaber & Brewer 2000; Hawk, Coble & Swanson 1985).

subject content have been established. In the specifications for initial teacher training, primary school teachers devote more hours to pedagogy than subject matter, while secondary school teachers devote more hours to subject matter than pedagogy. Primary and secondary school teachers are required to have 3 to 6 months of practical professional experience. In comparison, most successful school systems have mandatory classroom experience of at least a year and often longer, for both primary and secondary school teachers. In Anambra, beginning teachers are required to participate in an induction or mentoring program of at least a year to help smooth their transition from training into the classroom.

#### Goal 4: Matching Teachers' Skills with Students' Needs

Emerging



Ensuring that teachers work in schools where their skills are most needed is important for promoting equity and efficiency. First, it is a way of ensuring all students in an education system have an equal opportunity to learn: without purposeful incentives, teachers tend to gravitate towards schools with better working conditions, which often serve better off students (Boyd, et al. 2005a; Hanushek, et al. 2004b). Second, it is a way of ensuring teachers are distributed efficiently—i.e., to minimize the number of surplus teachers at a given grade, subject or geographic area. Finally, ensuring teachers are a good match for their school can also increase their effectiveness and reduce turnover rates (Boyd, et al. 2002, 2005b; Jackson 2010).<sup>6</sup> SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:

- Are there incentives for teachers to work at hard-to-staff schools?
- Are there incentives for teachers to teach critical shortage subjects?
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In Anambra, teachers are provided with some monetary incentives to work in hard-to-staff schools, and critical

<sup>6</sup> Much research has been devoted to the issue of turnover. Several studies have noted that it is not always the most effective teachers who leave (Boyd, et al. 2007; Hanushek, et al. 2005; West & Chingos 2008). Yet, these studies also concede that there is still considerable room for schools to enact targeted policies aimed at retaining only the most effective performers.

shortage subjects have been identified. Teachers working in hard-to-staff schools, such as those serving students from disadvantaged populations, are entitled to receive either bonuses or a better compensation packages. In addition, teaching experience is used in making transfer decisions; using seniority as a basis for approving transfer requests may motivate the most seasoned and potentially best teachers to leave hard-to-staff schools. In several countries, the practice of allocating teacher positions based on seniority has resulted in higher turnover rates in hard-to-staff schools, as well as a larger proportion of teacher entrants, who may not be as effective as more experienced teachers. In addition, Anambra has identified critical shortage subjects, and created monetary incentives for teachers to focus on them.

#### Goal 5: Leading Teacher with Strong Principals:

Established



The quality of school heads is second only to classroom teaching as a predictor of student learning (Eberts & Stone 1988; Leithwood, et al. 2006). Quality principals attract and retain quality teachers (Boyd, et al. 2009a; Ingersoll 2001a, 2001b; Papa Jr., Lankford & Wyckoff 2002). Also, capable principals can spearhead much-needed change at the school level, so having strong leaders is important not only to ensure acceptable levels of performance but also to drive improvements. Finally, good principals can facilitate teachers' work and continuous improvement. The more capable a principal is, the more he or she can support teachers, create a sense of community, make teachers feel valued and ease their anxiety about external pressures (Mulford 2003). SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:<sup>5</sup>

- Are requirements to become a principal set up to attract talented candidates?
- Do principals have incentives to perform well?
- Can principals make key decisions to improve teaching?

In Anambra, entry requirements for school leadership exist; however, principals are not provided with performance-based incentives and their decision-making authority could be strengthened. Clear requirements and selection processes exist to become a

school principal. Principals must have completed an educational level of at least the ISCED 5A, a minimum of 20 years of professional teaching experience, a minimum of five years of professional administrative experience, satisfactory performance in a supervised internship, and participated in an induction or mentoring program. In Anambra, principal pay is highly competitive: principals are paid 140 percent or more of GDP per capita, but there are no performance-based incentives. While principals must participate in regular performance evaluations, they are not allowed to receive monetary bonuses based on their performance on the job. In addition, principals are required to provide guidance to teachers and decide on the distribution of time during school hours, but they do not have a say or decide on teacher hiring, firing, dismissals, or promotions.

### Goal 6: Monitoring Teaching and Learning

Emerging



Assessing how well teachers are teaching and whether students are learning is essential to devise strategies for improving teaching and learning. First, teacher and student evaluations help identify good practices, which can then be shared among the teaching staff to improve school performance. Second, identifying low-performing teachers and students is necessary to support them in a timely manner. Education systems need to be able to know when to provide struggling classrooms with adequate support to improve. Finally, such information is useful for accountability purposes. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:

- Is there enough student achievement data to inform teaching?
- Is there enough teacher performance data to inform teaching?

In Anambra, there are some student achievement data to inform teaching and teacher performance evaluations are regularly conducted, but the use of student achievement data could be strengthened. In 2003, Anambra participated in the Monitoring of Learning Assessment, an international assessment of student learning. Unlike top-performing systems, Anambra does not conduct regular national or sub-national assessments of student learning. However,

teacher performance evaluations are regularly conducted. Participation in both internal and external evaluations is mandatory for all public school teachers. Internal evaluations occur regularly (daily, weekly, and per term), while external evaluations occur at least once a year. Evaluations in Anambra rely on five or more sources and use at least three out of the following criteria to assess teaching: teacher knowledge, classroom practices, student background and student learning. In Anambra at least five percent of teachers failed their last round of external evaluations. Further, it is possible to track teachers over time.

### Goal 7: Supporting Teachers to Improve Instruction:

Established



Helping teachers be more effective in the classroom is vital. First, all teachers can improve—regardless of how effective they are at one point in time. Therefore, support mechanisms are necessary to help teachers reach their potential and perform at their best. Second, changes in classroom assignments and/or student populations can pose new challenges to teachers. Thus, during periods of transitions, teachers will need additional help to sustain their performance. Finally, support mechanisms can go a long way in preventing burnout and reducing turnover. Even motivated teachers may choose to leave if they are consistently ineffective, do not know how to improve and receive little support. SABER - Teachers considers two policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:

- Is teacher performance data used to improve teaching?
- Is there professional development to improve practice?

In Anambra, teacher performance data from evaluations are used to inform classroom practice, but professional development requirements could be strengthened. The schools conduct teacher performance evaluations and use these results to inform teachers as to how they can develop their instructional practices. Under-performing teachers, as judged on the evaluation results, may be assigned a supervisor or professional development. Further, professional development exists, but is not required and not used in a focused approach to improve

instruction. Professional development includes 5 or more types of activities other than courses and workshops or education conferences and seminars. The content of professional development for both primary and secondary school teachers is broad, including 5 or more aspects related to teaching, such as: (i) knowledge and understanding of subjects; (ii) understanding and teaching the curriculum; (iii) relating the curriculum to meeting the required learning standards; (iv) classroom management; (v) knowledge and understanding of instructional practices in main subjects; (vi) teaching students with special learning needs; or (vii) school management and administration. Individual teachers are responsible for paying for their professional development.

### Goal 8. Motivating Teachers to Perform:

Emerging



Incentives help education systems signal priorities. The more aligned incentives are with the behaviors and outcomes they expect from teachers, the more likely they will obtain them. Incentives are also a way of recognizing teachers' work. Teaching is a challenging job and incentives can let teachers know the results they have achieved are valued so that they continue working hard to sustain them. In addition, some types of incentives can influence the profile of the teaching profession and make it more competitive, dynamic and performance-driven. The presence of incentives can have affect the attractiveness of the teaching profession. SABER - Teachers considers three policy levers education systems can use to reach this goal:

- Are there minimum mechanisms to hold teachers accountable?
- Are there rewards for high-performing teachers?
- Are there sanctions for low-performing teachers?

There are some performance-related incentives in place and sanctions for low-performance, but mechanisms to hold teachers accountable could be strengthened. There are no requirements for primary or secondary school teachers to remain in the profession, but teachers can be dismissed for misconduct or child abuse. Teacher absenteeism is taken into account in performance evaluations, and may result in penalties such as salary deductions and/or dismissal. In addition, there are some rewards for high-performing teachers,

including: monetary bonuses, better chances of promotion, and more public recognition. Less than 1 percent of a teacher's salary is affected by performance. In addition, there are some sanctions in place for low-performing teachers. Performance on the job is used to decide whether to grant an open-ended appointment, and there is a mandatory probationary period. In Anambra, there are pay cuts for low-performing teachers and unsatisfactory performance on an evaluation may result in dismissal.

### Improving Teacher Policies: Priorities for Anambra, Nigeria

Overall, Anambra has achieved acceptable levels of development in five of the eight core SABER-Teacher policy goals. This indicates that Anambra has succeeded in setting clear expectations for teachers, attracting the best into teaching, preparing teachers with useful training and experience, leading teachers with strong principals, and supporting teachers to improve instruction. Yet, Anambra has room to improve in the goals of matching teachers' skills with students' needs, monitoring teaching and learning, and motivating teachers to perform.

### Matching Teachers' Skills with Students' Needs

There are two policy levers that governments can use to reach the goal of matching teachers' skills with students' needs: (1) establishing incentives for teachers to work at hard-to-staff schools; and (2) establishing incentives for teachers to teach critical shortage subjects.

Anambra rates Emerging in this policy goal, while Bauchi and Ekiti rate Latent—all three systems could benefit from better matching teachers' skills with student needs. In Anambra, teachers are entitled to incentives for working in hard-to-staff schools or for teaching critical shortage subject, but teachers do not have these incentives in either Bauchi or Ekiti. One way in which education systems can foster a more equitable distribution of teachers is by using incentives; however, the evidence suggests that the design of these incentives programs matters. Across these three education systems, teaching experience is used in

deciding transfer priorities. Even systems with well-designed incentives to attract teachers into hard-to-staff schools, may have an inequitable teacher distribution if experienced teachers receive priority in transfer assignments.<sup>7</sup> Using seniority as a basis for transfers may motivate the most seasoned and potentially best teachers to leave hard-to-staff schools.

### Monitoring Teaching and Learning

There are two policy levers that are key to monitoring teaching and learning: (1) establishing student learning assessment systems; and (2) teacher performance appraisal mechanisms.

Anambra and Ekiti have participated in selected international assessments of student learning. Anambra participated in the Monitoring of Learning Achievement (MLA) in 2003, and Ekiti participated in 1996 and 2003. Making student achievement data available to teachers is key to inform their diagnosis of the strengths and weaknesses of their students and their lesson planning: the more information teachers have about the learning levels of their students, the better they can prepare to contribute to their students' learning progress. Nigeria's education systems could benefit from partaking in more frequent international assessments, and instituting national or sub-national assessments of students learning.

### Motivating teachers to perform

There are three policy levers that are key to motivating teachers to perform: (1) minimum mechanisms to hold teachers accountable; (2) rewards for high-performing teachers; and (3) sanctions for low-performing teachers.

Anambra rates Emerging in this policy goal, while Bauchi and Ekiti rate Established. Neither Anambra nor Bauchi have requirements for primary or secondary school teachers to remain in the profession. Requirements for staying in the profession are important for at least two reasons. First, in virtually all education systems, most teachers eventually get a

permanent job. By establishing requirements to remain in teaching, education systems can dismiss teachers who do not meet such standards. Second, some teachers who are initially effective may not continue to perform well. Requiring teachers to meet some standards in order to remain in the teaching profession can facilitate the removal of ineffective teachers. In addition, in Anambra, a teacher's performance evaluation is not factored into the salary schedule. In high-performing systems teachers get monetary bonuses or higher salaries based on their performance, better chances of promotion and more public recognition.

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<sup>7</sup> This is concerning given that research shows that it is the teachers with the best pre-service qualifications who are most likely to apply to transfer to other schools (Boyd, et al. 2009b) and that school accountability rankings make teachers want to transfer out of low-performing schools (Feng, Figlio & Sass 2010).

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The Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) initiative collects data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world and benchmarks them against practices associated with student learning. SABER aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results—from students, administrators, teachers, and parents to policymakers and business people—an accessible, detailed, objective snapshot of how well the policies of their country's education system are oriented toward ensuring that all children and youth learn.

This report focuses specifically on policies in the area of teacher policies.

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